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THE FALLOUT FROM COMMUNITY
COMMUNICATIONS CO. V CITY OF
BOULDER: PROSPECTS FOR A
LEGISLATIVE
SOLUTION*
Benjamin A Civiletti**
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Community Communications Co.
v. City ofBoulder' has generated intense interest in, and lively debate con-
cerning, the potential imposition of antitrust liability-including criminal
sanctions and treble damages--on local governments.2 This article briefly
examines the Boulder decision and discusses potential legislative solutions
to the concerns raised by the decision and its perceived ramifications.
I. THE BOULDER DECISION
Boulder involved a challenge under the federal antitrust laws3 to an or-
dinance enacted by the City of Boulder, Colorado. The city is a "home
rule" municipality which, under the Colorado Constitution, enjoys exten-
sive powers of self-government in local and municipal matters.4 It was
sued by Community Communications Company (CCC), the assignee of a
* This article is adapted from three speeches given to the National League of Cities
(Apr. 30, 1982), the National Association of Counties (July 12, 1982), and the American
Public Works Association (Sept. 13, 1982).
** Attorney General of the United States, 1979-1981. Currently a partner with Ven-
able, Baetjer, Howard and Civiletti, Washington, D.C. The author acknowledges the assist-
ance of Abbe David Lowell and Leslie A. Vial in the preparation of this article.
1. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
2. "Local governments" include counties, cities, towns, and municipal corporations.
For convenience, the term "municipality" or "city" may sometimes be used. It should be
noted, however, that not all types of local governments perform the same functions or oc-
cupy the same relationship with the state. See Note, Antitrust Law and Municial Corpora-
tions. Are Municipalities Exempt from Sherman Act Coverage under the Parker Doctrine?, 65
GEO. L.J. 1547, 1550 n.18 (1977). Such differences could be important under the facts of a
particular case, but are less so in the context of a discussion of possible legislation.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
4. The Colorado Home Rule Amendment, CoLo. CoNsT. art. XX, § 6, provides in
pertinent part:
The people of each city or town of this state, having a population of two thou-
sand inhabitants. . . are hereby vested with, and they shall always have, power to
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twenty-year, revocable, nonexclusive permit to conduct a cable television
business within city limits.
Since 1966 CCC had provided cable television service to the University
Hill area of Boulder, an area inhabited by approximately twenty percent of
the city's residents, and where, for geographical reasons, broadcast televi-
sion signals could not be received.5 Until 1980, because of the limits of
available technology, that service consisted essentially of retransmitting
commercial broadcast television from Denver, Colorado or Cheyenne,
Wyoming. During the latter part of the 1970's, however, the development
of cable and satellite technology permitted cable operators to offer a
greatly expanded array of programming, including sports and movies.
Consistent with the experience of other localities, the increased program-
ming and lower costs made feasible by developing technology increased
public interest in, and demand for, cable service. Desirous of tapping the
increased market, CCC informed the Boulder City Council in May 1979
that it intended to expand its business into other areas of the city and be-
gan negotiations with city utilities for the use of their poles to carry its
cables.6
The potential market for cable service attracted new entrants into the
industry as well. In July 1979, Boulder Communications Company (BCC)
also wrote to the city council expressing an interest in obtaining a permit to
provide competing cable television service throughout the city. BCC's let-
ter outlined its proposal and stated that it was prepared to go forward no
matter what action the city took with respect to CCC.
7
The city then initiated a review of its cable television policy, which in-
cluded hiring a consultant and holding a number of study meetings. On
the basis of the consultant's advice that cable television had a tendency to
make, amend, add to or replace the charter of said city or town, which shall be its
organic law and extend to all its local and municipal matters.
Such charter and the ordinances made pursuant thereto in such matters shall
supersede within the territorial limits and other jurisdiction of said city or town any
law of the state in conflict therewith.
It is the intention of this article to grant and confirm to the people of all munici-
palities coming within its provisions the full right of self-government in both local
and municipal matters. ....
The statutes of the state of Colorado, so far as applicable, shall continue to apply
to such cities and towns, except insofar as superseded by the charters of such cities
and towns or by ordinance passed pursuant to such charters.
5. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 44. CCC's permit allowed it to serve the entire city if it chose
to do so. Id
6. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1036-37
(D. Colo.), rev'd, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
7. Boulder, 485 F. Supp. at 1036-37; 455 U.S. at 45 & n.5.
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become a natural monopoly,8 and its own view that CCC might not offer
the city's residents the best cable system, the city council enacted an
"'emergency" ordinance prohibiting CCC from expanding its business for
three months.9 During the moratorium, the city drafted a model ordi-
nance and began negotiations for the provision of cable service with BCC,
which expressed a willingness to operate under the terms of the model
ordinance.'O
CCC sued in federal court for a preliminary injunction, pursuant to sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act,'" to prevent the city from restricting or revok-
ing its rights under the original permit. The city defended on the ground
that the moratorium and negotiation of the model ordinance constituted
regulation of use of public ways and, as such, were exercises of the city's
police powers and exempt from antitrust scrutiny under Parker v. Brown.12
The federal district court agreed that the city had the right and responsi-
bility to control and regulate the use of the public ways and that some
restrictions on the use of utility poles were reasonably necessary to protect
the public. The court disagreed, however, that the approach the city had
taken-negotiating an ordinance with a private entity as if it were a con-
tract-was an appropriate exercise and articulation of the city's policy of
regulation: "It is not characteristic of utility regulation for the regulating
authority to negotiate with those to be regulated and then formulate the
8. Boulder, 485 F. Supp. at 1037.
9. Id The ordinance actually amended the earlier ordinance which constituted CCC's
permit. A second ordinance revoked the permit, which was then reenacted to include the
moratorium. Both ordinances expressly stated that their purpose was to allow other cable
companies to make proposals for serving the city. Id
10. Id Although the city council thought it had a responsibility to regulate cable televi-
sion, it had received advice questioning its authority to do so. The council believed, how-
ever, that it could achieve the desired regulatory ends by contract and thus forestall a
challenge to its regulatory authority by the regulated company. It therefore included con-
tract language in the model ordinance, and submitted a draft to BCC for comments and
acceptance. Id at 1038.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
12. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Parker involved a California agricultural marketing program
that restricted raisin production in order to stabilize prices. The Court assumed that the
program would violate the Sherman Act if established by private parties, but found that
Congress intended the Sherman Act to restrain private anticompetitive conduct and not
"state action or official action directed by a state." Id at 351-52. The Parker doctrine,
although commonly referred to as an exemption or immunity, is, in fact, a determination
that the antitrust laws do not apply to certain state-maintained activities.
Additionally, the Parker Court indicated that a state could not immunize private action
that violated the antitrust laws merely by authorizing that action, and the Court expressly
refrained from considering the situation where a state or municipality participated in a pri-
vate agreement to restrain trade. Id The "exemption" announced, therefore, was by no
means a blanket immunity for all state action.
19831
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final policy by exercising legislative power through an offer and acceptance
mechanism." 13 The court found that the city's regulation using the con-
tract approach did not constitute governmental action and, therefore, that
the city did not enjoy state action immunity under Parker.
The court then examined the city's allegedly anticompetitive actions to
determine whether a preliminary injunction was appropriate. While the
court found no agreement or other conduct that would constitute a per se
violation of the antitrust laws, 4 it nevertheless issued an injunction after
evaluating the challenged conduct under the rule of reason.' 5 The court
disagreed that cable television was a natural monopoly and found that
competition was feasible. With respect to the city's claim that its motiva-
tion was to foster competition in the long run, the court found that "the
direct and immediate effect [was] a restraint of trade and an artificial and
unreasonable geographical market allocation."' 6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed,
holding that the Parker state action doctrine did apply.' 7 The court of
appeals found a distinction, for purposes of the availability of Parker im-
munity, between a municipality's governmental and proprietary acts. Be-
cause the city was not in the television business, the Tenth Circuit found
the ordinance to be an exercise of the city's governmental authority rather
than a proprietary act and, therefore, protected by the state action
exemption. 18
13. Boulder, 485 F. Supp. at 1039.
14. Id Although § I of the Sherman Act prohibits "[elvery contract, combination...
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade," 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), the Supreme Court has held that
Congress intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints of trade, Eg., Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. I (1911); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
Certain restraints of trade are held to be per se unreasonable: "IT]here are certain agree-
ments or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any
redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal with-
out elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their
use." Northern Pac. R., 356 U.S. at 5.
15. Boulder, 485 F. Supp. at 1039-40. Where challenged conduct is not per se illegal, a
court must inquire into the nature, purpose, and effect of the alleged restraint in order to
determine its reasonableness and hence its legality. Eg., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
16. Boulder, 485 F. Supp. at 1039.
17. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980),
rey'd, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
18. Id at 707. The court also appeared. to be influenced by the city's announced pur-
pose in enacting the moratorium was to foster free competition in the cable market in the
city. Id at 708. The governmental/proprietary distinction relied on by the Tenth Circuit
previously had been suggested by Chief Justice Burger in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 418 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
[Vol. 32:379
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari' 9 to determine "whether a 'home
rule' municipality, granted by the state constitution extensive powers of
self-government in local and municipal matters, enjoys the 'state action'
exemption from Sherman Act liability announced in Parker v. Brown.""
The Court reversed the Tenth Circuit.2" After reviewing its earlier deci-
sion in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. ,22 and other deci-
sions that had considered the applicability of Parker state action immunity
in contexts other than municipal action,23 the Court concluded that the
city's ordinance would not be exempt from antitrust scrutiny unless it con-
stituted the action of the state itself or unless it was "municipal action in
furtherance or implementation of clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed state policy."24
The city had argued that, because Colorado's Home Rule Amendment
vested in the city "every power theretofore possessed by the legislature...
19. 450 U.S. 1039 (1981).
20. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 43. Because the Tenth Circuit determined that the city's action
was immune from antitrust scrutiny under Parker, it did not reach the question of the legal-
ity of that conduct under the antitrust laws. Thus the only issue presented to the Supreme
Court was the availability of Parker immunity to the city.
21. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 57.
22. 435 U.S. 389 (1978). In Lafayette, two municipally owned power companies
brought an antitrust action against a large, privately owned utility which counterclaimed
alleging that the municipalities had engaged in sham litigation, and had entered into illegal
"tying" arrangements and anticompetitive long-term supply contracts and debenture agree-
ments. The municipalities moved to dismiss the counterclaims, alleging state action immu-
nity. The district court dismissed the claims under Parker, but the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit, holding that the definition of "person"
covered by the antitrust laws included cities, whether as plaintiffs or defendants, and that the
cities had failed to show any overriding public policy which would mandate excluding mu-
nicipalities from the coverage of the antitrust laws. A plurality of the Court determined that
the Parker doctrine did not automatically exempt from the antitrust laws all governmental
entities, whether state agencies or subdivisions, simply by reason of their status as such.
Instead, Parker exempted only anticompetitive conduct engaged in as an act of government
by the state as sovereign, or by its subdivisions pursuant to state policy to displace competi-
tion with regulation or monopoly public service.
The plurality noted that, in examining the activities of private entities claiming state ac-
tion immunity in earlier cases, it had found significant the fact that the state policy requiring
the anticompetitive restraint "was one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed." In
the context of allegedly anticompetitive actions by local governmental entities, the plurality
agreed with the Fifth Circuit and noted that "an adequate state mandate for anticompetitive
activities of cities and other subordinate governmental units exists when it is found 'from the
authority given a governmental entity to operate in a particular area, that the legislature
contemplated the kind of action complained of.'" Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415 (citation omit-
ted). Thus, specific, detailed legislative authorization was not necessary. Id
23. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
24. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 52.
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in local and municipal affairs, [the] cable moratorium ordinance [was] an
'act of government' performed by the city acting as the state" with respect
to municipal affairs and was therefore exempt under Parker. The Court
disagreed, recapitulating the historic distinction between states and their
subdivisions and holding that municipalities are not on similar sovereign
footing.25
The Court then considered the city's argument that the Colorado Home
Rule Amendment constituted an "adequate state mandate" for its an-
ticompetitive action because the amendment's guarantee of local auton-
omy fulfilled the requirement of a clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy and because the state had contemplated that home
rule cities would take the action complained of.26
The Court determined that the state's position toward the city's ordi-
nance was one of "precise neutrality":
A State that allows its municipalities to do as they please can
hardly be said to have 'contemplated' the specific anticompetitive
actions for which municipal liability is sought. Nor can those
actions be truly described as 'comprehended within the powers
granted,' since the term, 'granted,' necessarily implies an affirma-
tive addressing of the subject by the State.27
Home rule, which allows each municipality to determine its own course
with respect to regulating cable television, could not be said to be "a
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy" to displace
competition with regulation or monopoly public service in the cable televi-
sion area. The Court therefore determined that the Parker exemption did
not bar the district court's grant of injunctive relief against the city.
Because the only question presented to the Court was the availability of
the state action exemption for home rule cities, the Court did not decide
whether the city's ordinance actually violated the antitrust laws.2" In addi-
tion, the Court expressly reserved the questions whether "certain activities,
which might appear anticompetitive when engaged in by private parties,
take on a different complexion when adopted by a local government," and
what remedies would be appropriate against municipal officials.29
25. Id at 52-53.
26. Id at 54-55.
27. Id at 55 (emphasis in original).
28. Id at 58 (Stevens, J., concurring).
29. id at 56 n.20. Potentially as important as the expressly reserved questions is an-
other question that the Court did not mention. In Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105, the Court re-
quired that a state actively supervise private anticompetitive conduct engaged in pursuant to
state policy in order for private parties to share the state's exemption from antitrust liability.
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II. RAMIFICATIONS OF BOULDER
The full ramifications of the Boulder decision are not yet known and
may not be realized for some time. Nevertheless, a variety of effects, some
immediate and some more remote but no less important, can be predicted.
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that an injured plaintiff who
proves a violation of the antitrust laws "shall recover" treble damages."0
Although the Court, in Lafayette and Boulder, expressly reserved the ques-
tion of subjecting local governmental entities and their officials to such
awards,3' the mandatory nature of the statutory language creates the possi-
bility that a municipality held liable for restraint of trade will be required
to pay treble damages.32
The impact of a treble damage award on a municipal treasury could be
devastating.33 In Lafayette, for example, Louisiana Power & Light Com-
pany sought damages of $180 million, $540 million after trebling.3 4 Few
local governmental entities could satisfy a judgment of such magnitude
and remain solvent. Even if not actually bankrupted by such an award, a
municipality's ability to provide essential services would be severely hin-
dered by the allocation of other funds in the budget to satisfy an antitrust
judgment. The brunt of such an award ultimately, of course, would fall on
the municipality's taxpayers whose assessments must be increased in order
The Court in Boulder did not indicate whether state supervision was required or whether
active municipal supervision of municipal action would suffice.
30. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), provides in pertinent part:
"Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbid-
den in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
31. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 401-02; Boulder, 455 U.S. at 56 n.20.
32. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 440 n.30 (Stewart, J., dissenting), 442-43 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting); Boulder, 455 U.S. at 65 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Note, The Applica-
tion ofAntitrust Laws to MunicipalActiviies, 79 COLUM. L, REv. 518, 544 nn.189-90 (1979)
(arguing that the Supreme Court, nevertheless, can properly decide that treble damages are
not applicable to municipalities); Comment, City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co.: Will MunicipalAntitrust Liability Doom Effective State-Local Government Relations?, 36
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 129, 142 & n.88 (1979) (arguing that treble damage awards against
cities were not contemplated by Congress which enacted the penalty section and should not
be made until Congress expressly directs their imposition).
33. Cities are, of course, subject to damage awards and other penalties under a variety
of statutes. See Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 400-02 & nn.19-21; Note, supra note 2, at 1581. How-
ever, potential antitrust damages are, in general, substantially greater than those damages
which have been awarded against local governmental entities in other contexts. See Lafay-
ette, 435 U.S. at 442 & n.l (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 2, at 1581-82 &
n.209.
34. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 440 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id at 442 n.1 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
1983)
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to provide sufficient revenue to run the government and to pay damages.35
Although such damages would be severe, the realities of litigation are
such that awards of treble damages may not be made for a number of
years.36 A more immediate and more important effect of the Boulder deci-
sion will be the substantially increased number of lawsuits which are likely
to be brought against municipalities.3 7 A variety of franchisers, develop-
ers, businesses and deliverers of municipal services are likely to sue when
frustrated by regulation of their business38 or the grant of an exclusive
franchise to a competitor, whether for the provision of ambulance serv-
ices,39 or a pro shop concession at a municipal golf course.4" Regardless of
the outcome of such lawsuits, cities will have to expend a substantial
amount of money and time in their defense rather than in providing serv-
ices and government for their residents.4'
Additionally, the examination, during litigation, of municipal actions
according to antitrust standards may have undesirable consequences. An-
titrust law does not now recognize as a defense the argument that competi-
tion poses a potential threat to public safety.42 A municipality's primary
35. See id at 440-41 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Note, supra note 32, at 544 &
n. 188; Local Government Antitrust Liabiity--The Boulder Decision.: Hearings Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. Aug. 31, 1982 (statement of John J. Dodds,
Jr., Mayor of Mt. Pleasant on behalf of the Municipal Ass'n of South Carolina, and state-
ment of Henry W. Underhill, Jr., City Attorney of Charlotte on behalf of the North Carolina
League of Municipalities) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
36. See, e.g., Boulder, 455 U.S. at 59-60 (Stevens, J., concurring).
37. Hearings, supra note 35, June 30, 1982 (statement of Howard Adler, Jr., and state-
ment of Robert J. Logan, City Attorney of San Jose on behalf of National Institute of Mu-
nicipal Law Officers, League of California Cities, and City of San Jose, and submitted
Report of National Institute of Municipal Law Officers). See id, Aug. 31, 1982 (statement
of Tracy Stallings, Mayor, City of Carrollton, Georgia, and statement of Henry W. Un-
derhill, Jr., City Attorney of Charlotte on behalf of North Carolina League of
Municipalities).
38. Eg., Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1981), vacating
and remanding, 485 F. Supp. 671 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (for further consideration in light of
Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982)).
39. Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Mo. 1982)
(suit filed before Boulder decided).
40. Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1090 (1979).
41. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 440-41 & n.31 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (noting that legal fees
to defend a current antitrust suit had been estimated at one-half million dollars per month
by The New York Times, June 27, 1977, Sept. 4, 1977). See Hearings, supra note 35, Aug.
31, 1982 (statement of Kirkman Finlay, Sr., Mayor, Columbia, S.C., and statement of Tracy
Stallings, and statement of Frank B. Gummey, III, on behalf of the Florida Municipal At-
torney's Ass'n, and statement of Henry W. Underhill, Jr.).
42. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 66 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing National Soc'y of Profes-
sional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978)).
[Vol. 32:379
Legislative Solutions to Boulder
concern, however, is with public welfare and safety. The requirement that
a city always act to further competition would substantially interfere with
its ability effectively to carry out its responsibilities.43
Positing the development of a defense for municipal actions on the
ground that their public benefit outweighs their anticompetitive effect,
however, raises the specter that a municipality's actions would be sub-
jected to substantive review by federal courts in order to determine the
reasonableness of the municipality's method of balancing competition and
public welfare.' Such scrutiny poses dangers similar to the substantive
due process review of state action conducted by federal courts during the
Lochner era.45 Moreover, substantive review by federal courts is simply
inefficient. The federal courts are ill-equipped to respond to or make deter-
minations about day-to-day local concerns.46
Equally troubling as the prospect of treble damage awards and antitrust
lawsuits against local governmental entities and their officials is the severe
"chilling" effect that Boulder is likely to have on responsible local govern-
ment action. Restrictive zoning, the requirement of business or occupa-
tional licenses, and grants of exclusive franchises to utility services are all
common actions by municipalities designed to further the public welfare,
yet all may subject municipalities to antitrust challenges. Consequently,
municipal officials may hesitate to act even if the proposed actions are
clearly in the best interest of the citizens."7
Finally, the Boulder decision may have a severe adverse effect on the
relationships of states with their political subdivisions. In recent years,
municipalities have gradually acquired greater autonomy over local mat-
ters.4" Although such autonomy has often been hard won,4 9 it reflects an
acknowledgement that local officials are more knowledgeable about, and
43. Hearings, supra note 35, June 30, 1982 (statement of Tom Moody, Mayor, Colum-
bus, Ohio on behalf of the National League of Cities). See Boulder, 455 U.S. at 66 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) ("Competition simply does not and cannot further the interests that lie
behind most social welfare legislation.").
44. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 67-68 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 439
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
45. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see Boulder, 455 U.S. at 67 & n.3 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
46. Hearings, supra note 35, Aug. 31, 1982 (statement of Tracy Stallings).
47. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 439 (Stew-
art, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 2, at 1582; Hearings, supra note 35, Aug. 31, 1982 (state-
ment of Tracy StaUings, and statement of Frank B. Gummey, III).
48. Note, supra note 32, at 528-29 & n.88; Hearings, supra note 35, Aug. 31, 1982 (state-
ment of Tracy Stallings and statement of Frank B. Gummey, III).
49. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 71 & n.7 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Hearings, supra note 35,
June 30, 1982 (statement of Tom Moody).
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better able to act on, local matters than are state legislators.5°
Faced with Boulder's unanswered questions, however, local governmen-
tal entities and officials who wish to ensure that their actions will not be
held to violate the antitrust laws must seek specific authorization for such
actions from the state.5' Such a requirement places municipalities in a
difficult position. The limited time during which many state legislatures
are in session52 and the variety of issues with which legislatures must deal
during their sessions could make timely authorization of municipal action
by the state almost impossible." In addition, the nature of the legislative
process may demand compromises or concessions from municipalities in
order to obtain authorization, thereby reversing the beneficial trend of in-
creased municipal autonomy.
The situation is also unsatisfactory from the states' point of view: home
rule or a general enabling act frees states from concern with a myriad of
local matters. 4 The necessity, after Boulder, of considering and acting on a
variety of specific requests from different municipalities could greatly
hamper the states' ability to deal effectively with matters of regional or
50. Note, supra note 2, at 1559-60 & n.78; Hearings, supra note 35, June 30, 1982 (state-
ment of Robert J. Logan); id Aug. 31, 1982 (statement of Tracy Stallings and statement of
Frank B. Gummey, III).
51. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 438 (Stew-
art, J., dissenting); Comment, supra note 32, at 147, 149.
52. Some state legislatures meet only biannually, see Hearings, supra note 35, June 30,
1982 (statement of Janet Gray Hayes, Mayor of San Jose, Cal. on behalf of the United States
Conference of Mayors); others sit for only 90 days each year, see MD. CONST. art. III, § 15.
53. The Lafayette Court stated that, as of the 1972 Census of Governments, there were
38,552 counties, municipalities and townships in the United States. 435 U.S. at 407-08 &
n.34, this is an average of more than 730 per state. If even a fraction of those local govern-
mental entities requests state legislation dealing with particular circumstances, the state leg-
islature's consideration of those requests along with usual state business could require more
time than is allotted for the state legislature's session. See also Hearings, supra note 35, June
30, 1982 (statement of Janet Gray Hayes and statement of Hugh Allen, Jr., Mayor of Demo-
polis, Ala.).
54. See Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 435 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 32, at 532 &
n. 109; Comment, supra note 32, at 147; Hearings, supra note 35, June 30, 1982 (statement of
Robert J. Logan and statement of Hugh Allen, Jr.).
Indeed, in some states where home rule exists, the state legislature is forbidden to act on
matters of a local nature. In such states the legislature will be unable to provide any protec-
tion for a municipality carrying out its normal governmental functions. See Boulder, 455
U.S. at 71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 32, at 532 n.108. See also Hearings,
supra note 35, Aug. 31, 1982 (statement of Roy D. Bates, City Attorney, Columlia, S.C.).
This dilemma could be solved by repealing or abolishing home rule, but such a course
would reverse the trend toward greater local autonomy and lead to grave inefficiencies in
government. See Boulder, 455 U.S. at 71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Lafayette, 435 U.S. at
435 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Comment, supra note 32, at 149; Hearings, supra note 35, June
30, 1982 (statement of Robert J. Logan and statement of Tom Moody); id, Aug. 31, 1982
(statement of Kirkman Finlay, Jr. and statement of Frank B. Gummey, III).
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statewide concern. By creating the necessity for states to focus on local
concerns, Boulder interferes with the states' decisions regarding the inter-
nal delegation and assignment of governmental responsibility."
As is evident from the foregoing discussion, the principal effect of Boul-
der now, and for some time to come, is uncertainty-as to the type of state
authorization needed to immunize municipal actions, as to the availability
of a "public interest" defense, and as to the applicability of treble dam-
ages. It is this uncertainty, the inability of municipalities to predict the
consequences of specific acts, that may have the most detrimental effect on
responsible local government and effective state-local relations.
III. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
In Boulder's wake, municipalities' first need is to develop sound deci-
sionmaking and litigation strategies to minimize lawsuits and their effects.
However, the only long-term solution to Boulder's many problems will
have to come through legislation. 6
There are two legislative levels that can provide refuge to local govern-
ments from the dangers they face from Boulder's storm. The Supreme
Court, both in Boulder and in Lafayette, made clear that state legislatures
could exempt local governments from antitrust liability for their govern-
mental activities by making "clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed" delegations of state authority. 7 The Court thus invited states to
legislate so as to protect their subdivisions.
A question remains, however, as to the type of legislation which will be
effective to protect local governmental entities. Boulder made clear that
omnibus home rule laws will not suffice.5" Similarly, general enabling acts
will fall short of the test. Typically, such statutes contain very broad lan-
guage leaving to municipalities the choice of restricting competition, by
regulation or monopoly service, or some other course best serves local citi-
zens. 9 As with home rule powers, the municipality's ability to choose
competition or regulation would probably be held to evidence the lack of a
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy.
In fact, after Boulder, there is serious question whether any one law can
provide automatic protection for municipalities. Some states, such as Col-
55. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 438 (Stew-
art, J., dissenting). See Hearings, supra, note 35, June 30, 1982 (statement of Robert J.
Logan).
56. See generally Hearings, supra note 35.
57. See generally Boulder, 455 U.S. at 52; Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 413-15.
58. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 55.
59. Note, supra note 32, at 528-29 & nn.90-92.
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ora~do, have introduced bills that purport to provide blanket immunity for
their subdivisions. While such laws would affirmatively express a state
policy to allow regulation to displace competition, they still permit local
governments to choose the circumstances when regulation is appropriate.
Because it is doubtful that a state actually intends to displace competition
in every arena in which a municipality might act, it is questionable
whether such a law would be found to "clearly. . . [articulate] and affirm-
atively. . . [express] state policy" to displace competition in any particular
area.6 Moreover, a statute which purports to grant blanket immunity to a
state's municipalities could run afoul of the Parker admonition that a state
may not immunize private conduct which violates the antitrust laws
merely by authorizing it.6
It seems possible, therefore, that only specific state enactments authoriz-
ing municipalities to regulate or monopolize the particular area in which a
municipality intends to act will suffice as protection against antitrust chal-
lenge.62 As discussed above, such an approach presents numerous proce-
dural difficulties and is likely to affect adversely state-municipal relations.
Therefore, the state legislative approach presents almost as many problems
as it solves.
A second and better legislative solution is a federal one-an amendment
to the antitrust laws. This approach would have the advantage of provid-
ing a uniform rule throughout the country, of ending the uncertainty now
facing municipalities in every state, of preventing needless friction between
states and their subdivisions, and of avoiding the problems likely to arise if
municipalities seek piecemeal authorization from the states.
The most effective amendment would simply provide Parker-type im-
munity for local governments. Such legislation would exempt from anti-
60. See, e.g., Boulder, 455 U.S. at 52.
61. Parker, 317 U.S. at 351. See Note, supra note 2, at 1551 n.26; Note, Supra note 32,
at 529-30 & n.95.
62. See, e.g., Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956 (W.D.
Mo. 1982) (Missouri statute authorizing counties or cities to own ambulance or to contract
with one or more entities to furnish emergency service, and to establish rules and regulations
governing such service, sufficient to express state policy concerning ambulance service so as
to exempt Kansas City's actions in establishing a single ambulance operator system from
antitrust scrutiny). See also Note, supra note 32, at 534 & n. 124.
Hopefully, courts will recognize that a state may affirmatively express its policies concern-
ing competition other than through legislative enactments. For example, the Supreme Court
has already found that a state's highest court is capable of expressing a state policy to dis-
place competition with regulation. Eg., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
Similarly, a state agency vested with regulatory power over a specific field, which authorizes
municipal regulation within the field, should be found to express state policy to replace
competition with regulation. Cq Note, supra note 32, at 534 & n. 124.
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trust scrutiny actions by a local governmental entity if that entity
established an affirmative policy of substituting regulation or monopoly
public service for competition, actively supervised the regulated activity,
and acted within its authority under state law.63 Such an approach has
been criticized on the ground that it might exempt from scrutiny some
actions taken by a municipality purely to increase its own revenues from a
proprietary activity." However, local governments and officials are sub-
ject to a variety of federal and state laws designed to prevent or remedy
abuse of power. The addition of antitrust liability would add little real
protection to that provided by these laws.65 It would, however, as it has
already done, subject municipalities to a substantially increased number of
law suits. Establishing a Parker-type immunity for municipalities, unlike
other legislative solutions, would limit the litigation to which local govern-
ments would be subjected, providing necessary freedom of operation, and
would avoid the danger of unchecked substantive review of municipal en-
actments by federal courts.
Should a total Parker exemption not be feasible, federal legislation
could take a number of other forms. One possibility is an amendment to
the Clayton Act expressly providing that treble damages are not available
against local government entities." Such a law would avoid the difficulties
inherent in providing a defense grounded in the governmental nature of
the challenged municipal action.67 On the other hand, even single dam-
63. Hearings, supra note 35, June 30, 1982 (statement of Tom Moody).
64. See Note, supra note 32, at 538.
65. A short listing of those laws would include federal protections of due process
and equal protection. This, of course, includes actions under section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act, and both federal and state requirements concerning open meet-
ings, freedom of information, public disclosure of the financial interests of public
officials, and anticorruption and conflict of interest laws.
Hearings, supra, note 35, June 30, 1982 (statement of Janet Gray Hayes).
66. See Comment, supra note 32, at 148-49 (arguing that Congress should reassess its
prior reluctance to remove treble damage liability in certain cases, but that, because the
Congress which enacted the treble damage penalty probably did not consider its impact on
municipalities, treble damages should not now be awarded against municipalities absent
express congressional statement that they should be so applied); Note, supra note 32, at 544
& nn. 190, 193 (stating that the language of the Sherman Act offers no indication that munic-
ipalities are not to be subject to treble damages, but arguing that, because the framers of the
Sherman Act did not foresee municipal defendants, the Court can judicially create an excep-
tion for local governmental entities). Cf. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 443 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) (listing instances when Congress has rejected legislation that would make treble
damages discretionary).
67. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text. See also Areeda, Antitrust Immunity
for "State Action" after Lafayette, 95 HARV. L. REv. 435, 441, 443 (1981); Note, supra note
32, at 524-27 (discussing difficulty of drawing proprietary-governmental distinction).
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ages in an antitrust suit could be devastating to a municipal treasury," and
would be entirely inappropriate if the anticompetitive governmental action
had been taken in furtherance of the public welfare.
A second type of law would establish a governmental interest defense
for local governments, should one not be developed by the courts them-
selves.69 Under such a rule, a municipality would not be liable for an alleg-
edly anticompetitive action if it could show a competing governmental
interest, that the means chosen to achieve the end did not have an unrea-
sonable anticompetitive impact, and that the means selected substantially
furthered the asserted governmental interest.
Such a law would allow municipalities to avoid liability altogether
where they have acted governmentally and in the public welfare, but
would subject them to liability when their actions either were taken purely
for private benefit or were unnecessarily anticompetitive.70 It would, how-
ever, inevitably involve federal court review of local legislation in order to
determine whether an action was "unreasonably" anticompetitive or "sub-
stantially furthered" the asserted governmental interest.7 ' Although fed-
eral courts have had experience conducting similar reviews in the context
of equal protection challenges to state legislation, a defense that requires
such review presents a danger that courts may base their judgment of the
legality of municipal action on their view of the wisdom of an ordinance.
72
Moreover, while the first proposal would limit damage awards against mu-
nicipalities, and the second would provide them with an additional de-
fense, neither would stem the flow of litigation against municipalities or
could be asserted early enough in a lawsuit to alleviate the resulting diver-
sion of time and money from governmental purposes.
The achievement of a federal solution to the problems created by Boul-
der is not without its own procedural difficulties. Congress, like the state
legislatures, is confronted with numerous issues which demand its atten-
tion. Educating Congress to the problem and obtaining action on a pro-
68. Single damages sought in Lafayette were $180 million. 435 U.S. at 440 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). See also Comment, supra note 32, at 142 n.88 (discussion of potentially devastat-
ing class action judgments).
69. Note, supra note 32, at 539-41. The Court in Boulder, 455 U.S. at 56 n.20, reserved
the question whether "certain activities, which might appear anticompetitive when engaged
in by private parties, take on a different complexion when adopted by a local government."
With vigorous advocacy by municipalities, lower courts may take their cue from the above-
cited footnote and develop a special "rule of reason" for local governments which would
require weighing the public interest in displacing competition in a particular situation
against the general policy favoring competition.
70. Note, supra note 32, at 539-41.
71. Id at 540-41 & n.168; see also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
72. See Boulder, 455 U.S. at 67-68 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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posed solution may take a substantial amount of time. By the time any
action occurs, the issue of municipal liability may have been disparately
addressed by a dozen or more federal courts or state legislatures, resulting
in different laws governing the same conduct. And, as in the state legisla-
tures, opponents of local governmental authority may use the opportunity
presented by efforts to enact immunizing legislation to seek concessions or
compromises from cities and counties. That danger is somewhat amelio-
rated in the federal arena since the state is not the ultimate decisionmaker
there as it is in the state context. Nevertheless, achieving a federal solution
will not be easy.
IV. CONCLUSION
Local governmental entities have been thrust into a position of uncer-
tainty and jeopardy with respect to the exercise of their duties and powers
after the Supreme Court's decision in Boulder. The threat of treble dam-
ages, the prospect of extensive litigation, and the resulting uncertainty as to
the antitrust risks of operating local governments may paralyze effective
government and adversely alter relationships with states.
States can, under Boulder, protect their political subdivisions from anti-
trust liability by specific legislation, but the process of obtaining such legis-
lation for each action which a local government wishes to take may impair
effective government at both state and local levels and upset the current
balance between state and local regulation.
An amendment to the federal antitrust laws to grant municipalities
Parker-type immunity would provide a uniform rule and remove the un-
certainty currently facing local governments. Other types of federal legis-
lation have been suggested and would provide some relief. Parker-type
immunity for local governmental entities, however, would reduce litigation
against municipalities as well as limit the damages to which they might be
subject. Such a law would comport with the modern trend of government
authority by restoring to local governmental entities their ability to govern
effectively for the public welfare. To prevent a patchwork of different
rules arising in various courts and state legislatures, such an amendment
should be proposed and enacted quickly by Congress.
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